

# Creating a TPM based smart contract for the Medical Supply Chain in Hyperledger Fabric



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## **1.** Research aim and questions:

There are critical concerns on blockchain regarding security and privacy of data. Securing the smart contracts run in blockchain with the use of trusted hardware is a one of the solutions. TPM<sup>[1]</sup> was chosen as here trusted hardware to focus on.

#### Main and sub-questions:

How to use the trusted hardware TPM to protect the execution of smart contracts?

- How does the execution of a smart contract within a ledger work?
- What are the different functionalities of a TPM?
- How can the functionalities of a TPM be integrated with a smart contract?
- How can the performance of the secure smart contract be assessed?

## 2. Methodology

### Search terms:


Smart Contracts, Trusted hardware, TPM, Trusted computing

Literature (2005 – 2021 period) from research databases: Springer, Science Direct, IEEE, ACM

### Coding Tools used:

The virtual machine **Hyper-V**<sup>[2]</sup> with TPM enabled. Hyperledger Fabric<sup>[3]</sup> blockchain framework Programming language Go Opensource library Go-TPM<sup>[4]</sup> to interact with the TPM

Benchmark tools: Hyperledger Caliper<sup>[5]</sup> and Revive<sup>^</sup>cc<sup>[6]</sup>



Avg Latency

(s)

0.95 65.6

0.02 256.8

0.02

0.02 257.8

1.96 3.1

0.02 313.2

6.08 1.1

1.97 3.0

2.08 2.8

0.31 19.2

0.02 284.7

0.02 300.0

282.5

3. Background

Performance results

Latency

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.52

0.64

0.01

0.01

Min Latency (s)

Send Max

(TPS) (s)

75.9 2.56 0.10

3.2 2.89 0.63

313.3 0.12

1.1 9.80

3.1 3.01 0.58

19.2 0.61 0.08

2.8 2.89

284.7 0.10

300.0 0.10

256.9 0.23

282.5 0.14

257.8 0.14

Fail Rate

Succ

1000 0

15165 0

16677 0

15216 0

189

65

189

173 0

1143 0

16808 0

17710 0

18495

Hyperledger Fabric has various com

TPM has three main functionality<sup>[7]</sup>

Platform measurement and report

**Platform authentication.** 

Secure storage

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Request-function

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CancelRequest-function

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heckHolder-function

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## For the application, a simplified Medical Supply chain will be created. MedStore: Pharmacy network providing medical supply. Medical Supply: Asset which is traded on the network. Customers: Organization 1 which orders medicine from the MedStore. Regulators: Organization 2 handling customers requests. Integrate TPM to mitigate the security limitation: Wormhole attack TPM solution: **Checksum:** Check no alterations to Medical supply **Anonymity**: User provided names are hashed

Authentication: TPM-generated key and hashed username stored

4. Prototype:

	Pseudocode of the TPM function	5. Conclusion
mponents l:	<ol> <li>function TPMHASH(input)</li> <li>rwc, err = open tpm2 using the go-tpm libary on the /dev/tpm0 path</li> <li>if error ≠ NULL then</li> <li>return error that tpm couldn't be opened</li> <li>end if</li> <li>dataToHash = convert input string to byte array</li> <li>hashdigest, hashError = calling the tpm2 hash function on the dataToHash</li> <li>if hashError ≠ NULL then</li> </ol>	Working prototype which shows TPM has been used to secure a Mapplication. However, security comeasured.
orting.	9: return error occurred while hashing 10: end if 11: return hashDigest 12: end function	Future Work: - Research other use cases for true Development of more security

#### **Working Transaction** krn@vm:~/medical-supply/customers/application\$ go run app.go Throughput 2022/01/21 22:00:06 ====== (TPS) 2022/01/21 22:00:06 TPM Key used is: n[N@/e0000R00000k600000 2022/01/21 22:00:06 Choose number to invoke function: 1 - Request a medicine Check User History Search Medicine by name Check available medicine 2022/01/21 22:00:08 Medicine name (e.g. Aspirin) 2022/01/21 22:00:12 Medicine number (e.g. 00001) 2022/01/21 22:00:14 --> Submit Transaction: Request, function sends request for medicine. 2022/01/21 22:00:17 { "checkSum": "medName": "aspirin" "medNumber": "00001"

"expiration": "2022.05.09", "price": "\$10" "holder": "alice" "class": "org.medstore.medicalsupply" "key": "MedStore:aspirin:00001'

potential as Medical could not be fully

rusted hardware

Development of more security analysis tools

#### References:

[1] Trusted Computing Group (TCG). Trusted platform module, 2022. Available: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/trusted platform-module/ [2]Introduction to Hyper-V on windows 10., 2022. Available: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-[3] The Linux Foundation. Hyperledger fabric main documentation., 2022. Available: https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/whatis.htm [4] Go-tpm module, 2021. Available https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/google/go-tpm [5] The Linux Foundation. Hyperledger caliper, 2022. Available: [6] sivachokkapu. Revive cc, 2020. Available: [7] Kenneth Ezirim, Wai Khoo, George Koumantaris, Raymond Law, and Irippuge Perera. Trusted platform module - a survey. 11 2012

#### Full code available at: https://github.com/Kevin-RN/medical-supply