

Investigating Arbitrageurs and Oracle Manipulators in Ethereum



Supervisor **T**UDelft Prof. Dr. Kaitai Liang kaitai.liang@tudelft.nl

1 Background




Figure 1: Smart contract lifecycle

- Smart contracts control over **\$79B** (USD) of assets on Ethereum ^[2]
- DeFi: the future of finance™
- o Decentralised
- Transparent
- Trustless
- Hundreds of millions of dollars exploited via smart contract vulnerabilities
- Up-to-date knowledge of vulnerabilities and countermeasures must be available

2 Methodology

- 1. Find prominent attack vectors
- 2. Buidl test cases of exploits
- 3. Implement known countermeasures
- 4. Try to find better countermeasures
- 5. Evaluate and compare different exploits

References

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3 Vulnerabilities

Transaction-Ordering Dependence

X Loss of funds X Consensus-layer instability




Figure 2: Adversary exploiting TOD vulnerability via Flashbots to extract value from txes

1. Bypass mempool

- (Archerswap/Flashbots)
- Private transactions
- 2. Order batching (CowSwap)

 Minimised slippage
- 3. Commit-reveal on rollups
- Guaranteed tx ordering
- Design paradigm: off-chain computation [3]
- Decreased trust guarantees
- X Signing raw transactions




Figure 4: Commit-reveal scheme flowchart

Oracle Manipulation

X Loss of funds




Figure 3: Adversary exploiting a vulnerable price gracle to arbitrage

- 1. Functional audits
 - Expert peer review
- 2. Time-weighted Average Price (TWAP)

 Resistant to flash loan + arb attacks
- 3. M-of-N oracle selection
- Delegate to trusted entities
- Design paradigm: best practices [3]
- Requires human competence and diligence

5 Conclusion

- Many categories of smart contract vulnerabilities [4]
- Highest risks: transaction-ordering (MEV) and oracle manipulation (flash loan attacks)
- Future work: improve trade-offs in trustlessness and decentralisation

Experiments available at:

https://github.com/kevincharm/arbitrageurs-and-oracle-manipulators