Combining Multiple ID's, Attributes, and Policies to Provide Secure Access Control within Hyperledger Fabric

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1. Background

Hyperledger Fabric

- A "permissioned distributed ledger technology platform" [2]
- Solves many enterprise-level issues of traditional, permissionless blockchain technologies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum

Secure access control in Fabric

- Currently implemented by X.509 user certificates
- Must be issued by Certificate Authorities (CA's)
- Must be validated by Membership Service Providers (MSP's)

Research into attribute-based access control

- Has been performed in many studies such as [3], [4] and [5]
- Has not been much applied specifically in the context of Fabric
- The concept of combining multiple ID's, attributes, and policies has **not** been studied in-depth

Problems

- Lack of decision variables for access control decisions
- Potential of role explosion in large-scale organizations
- Inability to effectively implement the **principle of least privilege**
- Potential to expose sensitive business information to unintended users Potential to be too restrictive and exclude users from required information

2. Research Question

Q: "How can secure access control in Hyperledger Fabric be guaranteed by combining multiple ID's, attributes, and policies with the components that regulate access control?"

- What is Hyperledger Fabric?
- What is secure access control in the context of Fabric?
- What are the components that regulate access control in Fabric?
- **How** can multiple ID's, attributes, and policies be combined in Fabric?
- **How** are the components for access control currently interacting in Fabric?
- What is the performance impact of ID-, attribute-, and policy-based access control in Fabric?

3. Methodology

Combination of **literature research** and **implementation** of custom smart contracts which provide access control using ID's, attributes, and policies.

Milestone 1

- Study Hyperledger Fabric Documentation
- Setup Local Test-Network

Milestone 2

- Study Literature
- Implement X.509 Generation CLI (Using Fabric CA)
- Implement Smart Contract 1 ("Access Controller")

Milestone 3

- Study Literature
- Implement Smart Contract 2 (Live Demo)
- Implement Client Application (Live Demo)

Milestone 4

- Study Literature
- Analyze Performance

Milestone 5

- Formulate Conclusions
- Formulate Future Work

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4. Design

Current Implementation

• Certificate Authorities and Membership Service Providers provide the first layer of security by checking if certificates are issued by trusted parties

Proposed Implementation

- Multiple attributes can be combined by combining one or multiple attribute checks (EQUALS, INCLUDES) using Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT)
- Multiple policies can be combined by having a smart contract maintain a different access policy for each operation that can be performed with it
- Multiple ID's can be combined by hashing and signing a "parent certificate", and storing this hash and signature in the "child certificate"
- By maintaining all parent certificates in a **hashmap** on the shared ledger, smart contracts on the blockchain can retrieve and verify these certificates



Figure 2. Combining multiple identities

5. Results

- The latency of this aforementioned "security smart **contract**" is almost linear with respect to the number of attributes that it needs to check
- For real-world cases, the increase in latency with respect to the number of attribute checks is *minor*

Latencies (Access with "own attributes")

| 1 attribute | 0.04 seconds |
|--------------------|--------------|
| 1000 attributes | 0.07 seconds |
| 10,000 attributes | 0.31 seconds |
| 100,000 attributes | 3.12 seconds |
| | |

0.05 seconds

0.07 seconds

0.37 seconds

3.40 seconds

Latencies (Access with "parent attributes")

| 1 | at | tri | bu | te | | |
|---|----|-----|----|----|--|--|
| | | | | | | |

- 1000 attributes
- 10,000 attributes
- 100,000 attributes



• A security smart contract extracts a client's certificate and determines whether access should be granted or denied, based on the provided policy

• Any other smart contract can invoke this "special" smart contract to determine whether it should handle the submitted request or deny access



Figure 1. Combining multiple attributes and policies

8. Definition of Terms

CA: Certificate Authority **IoT:** Internet of Things **HSM:** Hardware Security Module **IPFS:** InterPlanetary File System [1] **MSP:** Membership Service Provider

ORG#: Organization "#", which can transact on the channel **X.509:** Standard defining the format of public key certificates **Chaincode:** Deployed package of one or more smart contracts

6. Conclusions

 In this study, a new implementation for secure access control within Hyperledger Fabric blockchain technology has been proposed

• **Multiple attributes** have been combined using a simple scheme that build access policies by combining attribute checks with Boolean operators

• Multiple policies have been combined by storing multiple access policies on the blockchain ledger, and dynamically selecting the suitable one

 Multiple ID's have been combined by setting the hash and signature of a parent certificate as attributes while storing these parents on the blockchain

• The security smart contract, certificate generation tool ("certgen"), and demo application have been implemented and are publicly available via GitHub¹

• The **runtime overhead** caused by the invocation of the special smart contract was analyzed, and has shown to be *minor* in comparison with the base case

7. Future Work

 Research if it is possible to improve the runtime of the current access control smart contract to reduce the latency and improve the throughput

 Research if it is possible to allow users to set multiple parent certificates, either by allowing array-typed attributes or by performing recursive lookups

 Research if it is possible to allow more extensive policy definitions, for example by providing clients with more check or operator types

Research if it is possible to store the private keys of clients in Hardware **Security Modules (HSM)** to improve the security of the private keys

9. References

[1] IPFS Community. "IPFS Documentation". [Online]. Available: https://docs.ipfs.io/. Accessed: May 12, 2022. [2] Hyperledger Fabric Community. "Hyperledger Fabric Documentation". [Online]. Available: <u>https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/</u>. Accessed: May 12, 2022.

[3] L. Song, M. Li, Z. Zhu, P. Yuan, and Y. He, "Attribute-Based Access Control Using Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things", in *Procedia Computer Science*, 2020, pp. 231–242, doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2020.06.079. [4] S. Ding, J. Cao, C. Li, K. Fan, and H. Li, "A Novel Attribute-Based Access Control Scheme Using Blockchain for IoT", in IEEE Access, 2019, pp. (99):1-1, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2905846.

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